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Abstract 
 
 
Landowner participation and spatial coordination of land use decisions are key components for 
enhancing the effective delivery of ecosystem services from private land. However, inducing 
landowner participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes for coordinating land 
management choices is challenging from a policy design perspective owing to transaction costs 
associated with participation. This paper employs a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact 
of such costs on participation and land use in the context of an Agglomeration Bonus (AB) scheme. 
The AB creates a coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria relating to alternative spatially-
coordinated land use patterns. The experiment varies transaction costs between two levels (high 
and low), which affects the risks and payoffs of coordinating on the different equilibria. 
Additionally, an option of costly communication is implemented between neighboring landowners 
arranged on a local network to facilitate spatial coordination. Results indicate a significant 
difference in participation and performance under high and low transaction costs, with lower 
uptake and performance when transaction costs are high. These effects are, however, impacted by 
transaction costs faced in the past. Communication improves both AB participation rates and 
performance with the effect being greater for participants facing high transaction costs.    
  
Keywords: Agglomeration Bonus, Content Analysis, Coordination Games, Lab Experiments, 
Local Networks 
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1. Introduction 
 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) or agri-environmental schemes offer landowners 
financial incentives for actions designed to increase the supply of ecosystem services from 
privately owned land (Hanley et al. 2012; Hanley and White 2014). In many instances, spatial 
coordination is a desirable feature of such schemes, enabling the delivery of greater ecosystem 
service benefits compared to a situation where the uptake of contracts is spatially uncoordinated. 
Examples include greater biodiversity conservation benefits on farmland (Merckx et al. 2009; 
Dallimer et al. 2010; Wätzold et al. 2010), successful species reintroduction programmes and 
meta-population management on private land where habitat corridors permit wildlife movements, 
or where certain minimum sized contiguous habitat is needed (Williams et al. 2005; Önal and 
Briers 2006), enhanced water quality improvements (Lane et al. 2004; Lane et al. 2006), and native 
vegetation restoration (Windle et al. 2009). 
Since participation in PES schemes is voluntary, economists have looked for means of 
incentivising spatial coordination. One such mechanism is the Agglomeration Bonus (AB), 
originally developed by Parkhurst et al. (2002). The AB is a two-part payment mechanism where 
landowners receive compensation for participating/enrolling, plus a bonus if neighboring 
landowners participate and select the same land use activity. In this format, the AB resembles a 
coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria pertaining to different land use choices. The Nash 
equilibria can be Pareto ranked by their payoffs. Laboratory experiments have indicated that such 
a payment structure can produce a range of desired spatial patterns of enrolled land parcels 
(Parkhurst and Shogren 2007; Warziniack et al. 2007). However, Banerjee et al. (2012; 2014) 
found that spatial coordination is challenging, and the AB can often fail to produce the desired 
spatial patterns owing to coordination failure.  
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Additionally, participation in any PES scheme is associated with landowner transaction 
costs (Shortle et al. 1998; Kampas and White 2004). Examples of such costs include landowners’ 
travel time to meetings with government officials, the time and cognitive effort of determining the 
relative payoffs of signing or not signing a contract, and the costs of engaging farm advisors. Such 
transaction costs have been shown empirically to reduce participation in PES schemes (Falconer 
and Saunders 2002; McCann et al. 2005; Mettepenningen et al. 2009). The AB, with its more 
complex design, is likely to create additional transaction costs such as those associated with 
negotiating with neighbors. It seems likely then that the success of the AB will be influenced by 
the size of transaction costs relative to the payoffs of enrolling.  Yet no analysis to date has studied 
the effects of variations in transactions costs on the performance of the AB. Fooks et al. (2016) is 
perhaps closest to our study, in which the transaction costs are implicitly captured by a fixed 
submission fee. However, they studied a conservation auction and not a subsidy scheme as 
considered here.  
Our paper poses two main research questions. First, what is the degree of participation and 
spatial coordination realized in AB schemes under different levels of transaction costs? Second, to 
what extent can communication between neighboring landowners improve AB performance by 
mitigating any negative effects of transaction costs? We answer these questions using a laboratory 
experiment. Lab experiments are useful to this study because they bypass the fact that it is not 
practical, and often even impossible, to exogenously manipulate the size of transaction costs for 
PES schemes participation in the field; and because only a few PES schemes in practice today 
include payments for spatial coordination (Kuhfuss et al. 2016). By implementing a predefined  
fixed network structure in the laboratory, thus keeping the environmental complexity constant, the 
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experiment allows us to specifically investigate how varying transaction costs impact  spatial 
coordination within an AB setting.     
Our experiment is comprised of groups of subjects who decide whether to participate in an 
AB scheme by paying a fixed fee – the transaction cost of participation. The transaction cost 
treatment is manipulated in a within-subject design. Since we are interested in strategic interactions 
and spatial coordination, we use a circular local network. On this type of network every individual 
is connected to two neighbors (to their left and to their right) directly and indirectly to the others 
in the network (Jackson 2010). While serving as a suitable framework reflecting the decision 
problems of land managers on real landscapes, this specific network structure also allows us to 
contribute to the experimental literature on equilibrium selection and individual behavior in 
network coordination games (Berninghaus et al. 2002; Cassar 2007). The network is also useful 
for implementing our between-subject communication treatment in a format representative of 
social interactions in agricultural communities where communication incurs a transaction cost and 
but is expected to be more frequent between geographical neighbors than with others within a 
community.1  
 Our results indicate that participation is significantly higher when transactions costs are 
low than when they are high. Moreover, in the event that individuals incur the transaction costs 
and participate, we observe higher rates of spatial coordination.  The role of communication is not 
straightforward. Messaging unambiguously improves performance relative to no-communication 
situations when transaction costs are high. However, its efficacy in low transaction cost regimes 
                                                          
1 In the field, transaction costs and costs of communication might vary with the degree of environmental complexity 
owing to individual and landscape heterogeneity (e.g., due to the amount and nature of land holdings, the number of 
landowners, or the extent of their social capital). However, the dynamics of these factors can make it difficult to isolate 
how transaction costs and communication affect spatial coordination. Thus, in this study, we have controlled the 
transaction cost and communication cost to be the same for every individual.  
6 
 
depends upon whether subjects faced high costs in the past and had previous experience with 
participating in the AB scheme. 
 
2. The Strategic Environment 
There are 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 landowners who face two simultaneous decision opportunities. The 
first decision entails whether or not to participate in the AB scheme. If a landowner decides to 
participate, he or she can use his or her land for two different types of conservation land uses, 𝜎𝑖 =
𝑋, 𝑌, which produce different levels and types of ecosystem services benefits. Our choice decision 
is thus at the extensive margin and different from the original setup proposed in Parkhurst and 
colleagues 2002; 2007 where subjects make an intensive margin choice of how many acres to 
enroll. We have made this distinction so that our results may prove insightful in understanding 
choices facing actual landowners where enrollment options in a PES scheme are “all or nothing”, 
such as in the Conservation Stewardship Program under which the entire eligible acreage has to be 
enrolled in specific land uses to receive payments (NRCS 2016).  
We assume that the ecosystem service benefits delivered from coordination of land use type 
X have greater agglomeration rewards than for type Y, and the regulator sets the AB payments to 
reflect this ranking. Such differences in environmental benefits from spatial coordination of 
enrollment might reflect differences in the ecological objectives of a scheme, or in the kinds of 
land use change that are rewarded. Let 𝜎𝑖 = NP denote non-participation for landowner i whereby 
land is devoted to profit-based conventional agriculture, earning only agricultural returns.2 
                                                          
2 Traditional agricultural land use practices (denoted by NP) can also deliver ecosystem services such as reduction in 
soil erosion and biodiversity benefits by providing nesting and foraging habitats. These benefits are, however, not 
additional as they are associated with business-as-usual land use practices. Since one of the criteria for receiving 
ecosystem services payments is additionality (Wunder 2007; Engel et al. 2008), such benefits should not be rewarded 
by the conservation agency. We therefore do not consider them in our model.  
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The AB scheme consists of two payoff components. The base component is a participation 
subsidy, 𝑠(𝜎𝑖), intended to compensate for any opportunity cost of conservation relative to profit-
maximising agricultural land use. Landowner i receives an additional bonus, 𝑏(𝜎𝑖), if a 
neighboring landowner implements the same conservation land use practice as landowner i. Thus, 
the total bonus received is proportional to the number of neighboring landowners choosing the 
same land use strategy, denoted by 𝑛𝑖𝜎. We assume that the environmental agency provides AB 
payments for adoption of pro-conservation land use of one type only, i.e., landowners cannot 
choose both X and Y. We make this assumption because (i) PES schemes typically involve a menu 
of land use practices from which landowners usually can select a few suitable ones, and (ii) paying 
some landowners for undertaking all listed actions may exhaust the limited PES budget (Cooper, 
Hart, and Baldock 2009; Armsworth et al. 2012), creating high participation clusters in some areas 
at the expense of low participation rates elsewhere.3 Let 𝑟(𝜎𝑖) denote the agricultural revenue under 
land use 𝜎𝑖 = 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑁𝑃.  
If a landowner i chooses to participate in the scheme he or she incurs transaction costs, 𝑇𝑖. 
We assume that all landowners have identical transaction costs, i.e., 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑇, either High or Low 
depending on the treatment.  In practice, these transaction costs will vary substantially across 
landowners and across land use strategies. However, by sacrificing some realism (which would 
probably not cause large behavioral differences) we gain tractability to identify causal treatment 
effects.  The payoff, 𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖), of landowner 𝑖 under the AB scheme reads as follows: 
𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖) = {
   𝑟(𝜎𝑖) + 𝑠(𝜎𝑖) + 𝑛𝑖𝜎𝑏(𝜎𝑖) − 𝑇     𝑖𝑓 𝜎𝑖 = 𝑋, 𝑌
   𝑟(𝜎𝑖)                                                  𝑖𝑓 𝜎𝑖 =  𝑁𝑃
     (1) 
                                                          
3 Such localized clustering may be interpreted as geographical targeting of conservation funds which can be politically 
contentious to the extent that the U.S. Congress has prohibited such targeting (Shortle et al., 2012). 
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In Eq. (1) the number of neighbors and hence the bonus payment is contingent on the 
specific landscape structure. Following Banerjee et al. (2012, 2014), in this study we impose a 
simple circular network structure to represent neighborhood interactions. On such a circular local 
network 𝑛𝑖𝜎 can either take the value 0, 1 or 2. By employing a circular network each individual 
faces the same level of strategic uncertainty within the decision environment, since all have the 
same number of neighbors. Given this spatial symmetry in terms of the individuals’ location on 
the network, we avoid additional complications, such as holdout problems due to bargaining power 
of some individuals that are strategically located. In networks featuring an asymmetric 
neighborhood structure (e.g., a two-dimensional lattice grid or a straight-line), individuals could 
respond differently to the transaction cost variation and information available through 
communication.  
We note here that while the choice of network structure is simpler than the more complex 
spatial grids implemented by Parkhurst et al. (2002) and Parkhurst and Shogren (2007) to study 
spatial targeting, it still captures the main strategic interdependencies that are relevant for studying 
spatially contiguous land use. First, in many realistic environments, individuals typically do not 
interact with all individuals within their network directly but perhaps only interact with a few 
neighboring individuals who provide them with information about what others within the same 
network are doing. Second, like more complex spatial grids, a circular network also exhibits 
strategic uncertainty regarding individuals’ decision-making, especially if individuals have 
imperfect information about the choices of individuals that are not their direct neighbors (see 
Banerjee et al., 2014). In this sense, while simple, our strategic setting is relevant to studying such 
PES institutions. The payoff function specification in Eq. (1) makes the AB mechanism a 
coordination game with Nash equilibria pertaining to situations where individuals and their 
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neighbors choose the same strategy. This coordination game is similar to critical mass coordination 
games where the payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a specific number of players 
also choose that action (Devetag 2003). 
The AB coordination game has a Pareto efficient and multiple risk dominant Nash 
equilibria (Harsanyi and Selten 1988; Parkhurst et al. 2002). Strategy X corresponds to the Pareto 
efficient strategy as it generates the highest payoffs (because it has the greatest environmental 
benefits and hence highest agglomeration bonus). Strategy Y on the other hand constitutes a 
situation of coordination failure explained by the presence of strategic uncertainty within the game 
environment. That is, it might be less risky for a subject to choose the land use practice that 
corresponds to a lower payoff loss in the event that one or more of the neighbors chooses not to 
coordinate on the efficient outcome. Strategy NP is also an equilibrium strategy but does not 
involve participating in the AB scheme.    
Appendix B.I contains all parameters that have been used to construct the payoff tables 1a 
and 1b for the High (T = 40) and Low (T = 15) transaction cost treatments, respectively. The AB 
payments for X and Y are chosen to reflect the fact that ecosystem services generated through 
adoption of X land use are spatially contingent to a higher degree than those generated through Y. 
For example, X can correspond to land uses which when adopted leads to a reduction of habitat 
fragmentation. Here, the location of adopted use matters much more than in the situation where 
land use involves reduction in fertilizer use where the number of adoptees may matter more than 
their location. The value of the high transactions cost is chosen such that, the game features two 
Nash equilibria: 𝜎𝑖 = 𝑋 (∀𝑖) and the outside option 𝜎𝑖 = 𝑁𝑃 (∀𝑖) with the former one Pareto 
dominating the latter. Choosing land use practice Y is not a Nash equilibrium because it is strictly 
dominated by NP. Therefore, if a subject chooses to pay the fee and participate in the scheme, he 
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or she would be likely to choose X over Y. This is an interesting setting because the presence of 
the fee reduces strategic uncertainty and the coordination problem in the event of participation. 
Reasoning based on forward induction involves making an inference about the future play in a 
subgame based on information about play leading up to the subgame (Van Huyck et al. 1993; 
Cooper et al. 1994; Cachon and Camerer 1996; Plott and Williamson 2000; Dufwenberg et al. 
2016), and can then guide behavior towards making the efficient X choice. In contrast, for the low 
transaction cost setting, selection of Y by a landowner and both direct neighbors leads to a payoff 
which is not strictly dominated by the reservation payoff, yielding a third Nash equilibrium 𝜎𝑖 =
𝑌 (∀𝑖). This Nash equilibrium is risk dominant relative to the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium 
𝜎𝑖 = 𝑋 (∀𝑖). Forward induction is not applicable in this setting.  
Further, for the high transaction cost setting, T is greater than the participation payment for 
strategy X only. We chose this format because if the transaction cost is less than the participation 
components for both X and Y, participation is trivially incentivized even in the presence of the 
transaction cost and in the absence of the bonus. This is not an interesting case. The high-cost T 
value is not set to be greater than the participation payments for both strategies as well because 
this feature would further reduce landowner appeal to participate in the AB scheme. Under the 
low-cost condition, the transaction cost value is less than the participation component for both X 
and Y to generate a situation where participation is individually rational. We did not set T to be 
greater than both the participation components for reasons similar to those for the high-cost 
environment. Finally, setting the low value of T to be greater than the participation component for 
any one of the strategies would have been interesting but we decided to consider a scenario where 
incentives to participate are enhanced since, in the high-cost setting, participation barriers are 
substantial. Given this setup, we have two hypotheses: 
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HYPOTHESIS I: (TC1) Participation levels are lower in the high transaction cost treatment 
compared to the low transaction cost treatment.  
 
HYPOTHESIS II: (TC2) Conditional upon choosing to participate, choice of the Pareto efficient 
equilibrium action is more frequent in the high transaction cost treatment compared to the low 
transaction cost treatment. 
 
Additionally, the individual’s land use choice, and hence the ability of the AB scheme to 
reach the efficient outcome and maximize ecosystem services benefits, is influenced by the degree 
of community-level communication and interactions. This is especially important in PES schemes 
where landowners need to spatially coordinate their decisions (Lawley and Yang 2015). 
Communication can provide an opportunity to (i) announce and declare sustained commitment for 
a particular action, (ii) articulate reasons for having made a choice in the past as well as those 
which will guide future decisions, (iii) influence direct neighbors to choose the same strategy, and 
(iv) persuade direct neighbors to convince other social peers to make the same choice. Thus, 
communication might reduce strategic uncertainty and lead to a higher uptake, reduce or avoid 
coordination failure, and improve the ability of the scheme to generate the Pareto efficient outcome 
as has been presented by Parkhurst et al. (2002) and Warziniack et al. (2007). Warziniack et al. 
(2007) also find that pre-play communication reinforces landowners’ decision-making to reach the 
Pareto efficient outcome more quickly. Yet, in a conservation auction with AB payments, Fooks 
et al. (2016) find that communication may lead to collusion and higher rent extraction.4  
                                                          
4 Note that Parkhurst et al. (2002), Warziniack et al. (2007) and Fooks et al. (2016) focus specifically on spatial 
targeting, i.e., how agglomeration bonuses – both with and without communication – can promote the establishment 
of a pre-determined land configuration across space. In this paper we do not investigate spatial targeting as such and 
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Thus, the impact of communication in the AB context is predicated on the nature of the 
strategic environment. As a result, it is important to study the role of communication on AB 
outcomes in new settings such as the current one. Additionally, in all the aforementioned studies, 
communication was assumed to be costless for landowners and introduced as an exogenous 
treatment variable. However, communication typically incurs costs; for example, the time spent 
calling or visiting neighbors. In essence, this cost is another transaction cost associated with PES 
scheme participation and it is realistic to incorporate communication in a costly format into the 
current decision environment.  In fact, owing to the cost associated with messaging, landowners 
may be likely to recognize and place greater value on the content of the messages that are being 
sent and/or received. In doing so, the opportunities for communication might lead to a higher 
uptake, reduce or avoid coordination failure, and improve the ability of the scheme to generate the 
Pareto efficient configuration. In our model this is particularly true for the high transaction cost 
setting where there is no coordination problem and the only bottleneck is the participation hurdle.5 
Yet, the messaging fee could still serve as an impediment because subjects may not want to incur 
it and hence the benefits of communication may not be realized. Thus, our third hypothesis is: 
 
HYPOTHESIS III (Communication): Communication opportunities between neighboring 
landowners leads to (a) higher participation levels, and (b) given participation, improves 
coordination on the Pareto efficient equilibrium.  
 
 
                                                          
concentrate on the general coordination problem of achieving the efficient land use on a given spatial network of 
landowners. 
5 We note here that we chose the value of the messaging fee such that the Nash equilibrium strategies under the two 
transaction cost conditions are the same in the no-communication and communication settings.   
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 3. Experimental Design and Procedures  
We report data from 24 sessions with 8 subjects per session, as summarized in Table 2, 
producing a data set with 192 subjects. Each experimental session was divided into two phases 
consisting of 15 periods each. In Phase I for 12 sessions termed HLTC (abbreviating High-Low 
Transaction Cost), subjects faced the high transaction cost of 40, followed by the low cost of 15 
in Phase II. In the remaining 12 sessions termed LHTC (abbreviating Low-High Transaction Cost), 
the cost ordering was reversed. We implemented this within-subject variation (i) because 
transaction costs associated with the same economic decision may change over time, (ii) to 
minimize within-subject variation for comparison across treatments, and (iii) to study behavior of 
inexperienced subjects and those with some prior experience with a transaction cost value. 
Non-binding pre-play communication, denoted by COMM, was implemented as a 
between-subject treatment in 8 of the 24 sessions. Each subject could communicate privately in 
chat windows with adjacent neighbors for 60 seconds by paying a fee of 5 experimental francs per 
neighbor.6 Subjects could receive messages from neighbors for free despite having chosen not to 
communicate. This communication protocol is similar to the one implemented in Cooper et al. 
(1989) and represents the reality that communication is almost always costly for the sender 
whereas receiving messages (an email, voicemail or written communication) incurs minimal cost. 
Earlier we noted that forward induction could help subjects coordinate on the Pareto efficient 
equilibrium in the high transactions cost treatment. The choice to incur costs to communicate could 
signal intentions to play X (Cachon and Camerer 1996) and coordinate efficiently irrespective of 
message content. 
                                                          
6 We kept chat windows open for 60 seconds to ensure that even if subjects chatted in all 30 periods, the experiment 
would not last for more than 90 minutes beyond which subject fatigue might compromise the quality of responses.   
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 At the beginning of the experiment, every subject received a randomly-assigned ID that 
determined their location and their networked neighbors’ identities. This ID remained the same in 
Phase I. We implemented this fixed-matching protocol because private land ownership is usually 
unchanged for long time periods and also because repeated interactions with the same set of 
subjects can foster coordination by building subjects’ reputation for playing a particular strategy 
amongst their direct neighbors. At the beginning of Phase II the neighborhood structure was 
shuffled and every subject received a new ID and a new set of neighbors which remained 
unchanged henceforth. This ID switch was implemented to break any possible path dependence 
that is often present in coordination game experiments (Van Huyck et al. 1993; Romero 2015). 
This path dependence can confound the transaction cost variation treatment when transitioning 
from Phase I to Phase II. During each phase of the experiment, subjects received hand-outs (see 
Appendix B.II) containing information on the payoffs, the transaction cost of participation 
associated with that phase (15 or 40), the reservation (non-participation) income (175), and a figure 
representing their positions on the network.  
In the COMM treatment, at the beginning of a period, subjects first decided whether they 
wanted to pay the fee to communicate with their neighbors. Those who chose not to pay the fee 
waited for others to finish chatting. After this stage, everyone made their participation decisions. 
In the periods of the NO-COMM sessions, everyone proceeded to the participation stage directly. 
In this stage each subject had to decide whether to participate in the AB scheme by incurring the 
transaction cost. Neighbors’ participation decisions were not revealed while subjects made this 
decision.7 Individuals who chose to participate moved on to the next stage in which they selected 
land use X or Y. Those who did not participate earned the reservation income.  
                                                          
7 By following this approach, we were able to retain the simultaneous move feature of the coordination game although 
it comprised of two stages of decision-making.     
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Once all subjects made choices they received information about their own and their direct 
neighbors’ communication decisions, participation, land use choices and payoffs for the current 
period. Additionally, an on-screen history table provided this information for all past periods 
within a phase. In the COMM sessions, this History table also included subjects’ own and 
neighbors’ current and past communication decisions, and the total fees paid to communicate. 
We used content analysis methodology to analyze all messages from the COMM sessions. 
Three undergraduate students from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln reviewed chat content 
incorporated in 195 different chat rooms representing both dialogues and monologues. Rather than 
classifying individual chat sentences separately, all messages within a chat room were encoded 
jointly and classified into different categories on the basis of a message classification scheme. The 
classification scheme was developed on the basis of review of two randomly drawn COMM 
sessions (one for each transaction cost ordering). The content of each chat room could be assigned 
to multiple categories. In order to minimize bias, the research assistants coded statements without 
being aware of the research questions and did not interact with each other during this exercise.  
Since the coding is subjective, we measured inter-rater agreement using Cohen’s Kappa 
(Cohen 1960; Krippendorff 2004). This is a scaled measure of agreement and takes a value of 0 
when the agreement between coders is implied by random chance and 1 when the coders agree 
perfectly. Kappa values between 0.41 and 0.60 indicate that coders have Moderate agreement for 
that category, those between 0.61 and 0.8 indicate Substantial agreement and beyond that implies 
Almost Perfect agreement (Landis and Koch 1977). Table 3 presents a sub-set of categories from 
the message classification scheme which were coded with Moderate and higher reliability.8  
                                                          
8We did consider other categories and sub-categories in our analysis, but they were coded with less than “Moderate” 
agreement and hence are not presented in the paper. 
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The experiment was implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and subjects were recruited 
from the broad undergraduate Purdue University population using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) during 
August 2013 and November 2014. All experiment instructions (included in Appendix B.III) were 
made available on subjects’ computer screens. We did not include any contextual terminology 
relevant to ecosystem services provision other than land use because we wanted to study how 
financial incentives impact experimental outcomes and also because pro-environmental 
terminology can potentially trigger various subject behaviors and confound the treatment effect 
(Cason and Raymond 2011).  
 Experiment instructions indicated that all subjects would be facing the same payoff table, 
that all AB scheme payoffs were net of the transaction costs of participation, and that the 
experiment would last for 30 periods.9 Before starting the experiment, subjects participated in a 
quiz to verify their understanding. The sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Subjects were 
paid a $6 show-up fee and additional money earned during the experiment. An exchange rate of 
US$1 for 250 experimental currency (francs) was used to convert earnings, and average subject 
earnings (including the show-up fee) were $26.82.  
 
4. Experimental Results 
Our results focus on the role of transaction costs and communication on (a) participation 
levels in the AB scheme, (b) the rates of efficient land use choice, and (c) the degree of spatial 
coordination on the efficient land use choice.10 In Section 4.1, we present the results related to the 
first two aspects followed by the findings related to spatial coordination in Section 4.2.  
                                                          
9 To ensure that subjects knew that all payoffs were net of transaction costs, we clearly indicated their total payoff for 
each outcome in the experimental handout provided to them.  
10 The Y land use (although not payoff efficient) is valuable for delivery of ecosystem services benefits, but are spatially 
explicit to a lesser degree in our model as reflected by the lower AB payment. However, our results focus on the 
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4.1. Participation and Efficient Land Use Choices 
Consider first the findings from the non-communication (NO-COMM) sessions. The top 
two panels of Figure 1 present the participation rates in the two 15-period phases for both the cost 
treatments pooled across the 16 NO-COMM sessions. Participation rates are always higher under 
low transaction costs in both Phases of the experiment. These rates fall steadily from 70% in Period 
1 to 20% in Period 15 in the HLTC-NO-COMM sessions. By contrast, subjects in LHTC-NO-
COMM sessions are able to maintain relatively higher levels of participation with only a weak 
negative trend in Phase I. A non-parametric Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test based on session-level 
average rates of participation in Phase I indicates a statistically significant treatment effect at the 
5% level (p-value = 0.015).11 Thus, high transaction costs prove to be a deterrent for participation 
in the AB scheme, providing support for Hypothesis I. While this result is intuitive it is interesting 
considering that conditional on participation, no coordination problem exists in the high cost 
sessions. The weak negative trend for the low-cost setting also indicates that transaction costs are 
less problematic at low values for AB scheme participation.  
 
Result 1: High transaction costs can significantly reduce participation rates in the AB schemes. 
 
The falling rates of participation across repeated interactions under both cost conditions 
may be attributed to factors that resolve subjects’ strategic uncertainty (in favor of non-
participation) and impact the likelihood of participation. First, unlike in a non-network 
coordination game, both direct and indirect neighbors influence payoffs but only past choices of 
                                                          
participation and payoff efficient X choices because of the low frequency of Y choices in our experimental data 
(presented in Figure I in Appendix A), which makes it difficult to draw confident conclusions about Y land use for the 
current setting.  
11 All nonparametric tests reported in the paper employ independent 8-person groups as the unit of observation. 
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direct neighbors are visible. The second factor is that, given the structure of the payoffs, 
participation and subsequent coordination on X is profitable only when both direct neighbors 
participate. This feature is true for both high and low transaction cost values, but losses induced 
by coordination failure are greater when costs are high.12  
The experiment’s two treatment phases are useful for evaluating how subjects’ prior 
experience with a particular transaction cost regime affects participation. After the cost treatment 
switchover, in the HLTC-NO-COMM the participation rate jumps substantially from 20% in 
Period 15 to nearly 86% in Period 16. This increase is statistically significant (Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank test p-value = 0.013). The corresponding change from 78% to 80% for the 
LHTC-NO-COMM group is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test 
p-value = 0.943). This result suggests a path dependence in outcomes. Focusing on overall trends 
across all Phase II periods, we observe only a small decrease in participation in the HLTC-NO-
COMM from 85% in Period 16 to 78% in Period 30. For the LHTC-NO-COMM treatment, a fall 
in program uptake occurs from 79% in Period 16 to 36% in Period 30. However, no significant 
difference exists in participation rates between the HLTC-NO-COMM and LHTC-NO-COMM 
groups in Phase II (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test p-value = 0.14). To summarize: 
 
Result 2: Prior experience with low transaction costs reduces the negative impact of a transaction 
cost increase on future participation rates, moderating the effect of transaction costs as an 
obstacle for participation.  
                                                          
12 We adopted this feature to evaluate the performance of the AB scheme in an adverse payoff setting with the 
expectation that if the incentive scheme performs well in the current environment, it will perform even better in 
scenarios where efficient coordination is profitable even if only some neighbors choose X. Moreover, this adverse 
payoff situation also reflects recent reductions in PES scheme budgets overall, which require resources to be spread 
thinly over numerous existing programs (Claassen and Ribaudo 2016; Shortle et al. 2012). 
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 Figure I in Appendix A shows the percentage of X, Y and NP choices for both treatments 
for all periods. We observe 21% of Y choices when transaction costs are low and only 4% when 
costs are high in the NO-COMM groups. Thus, conditional on participation, most subjects select 
the efficient X strategy.13 The top panel of Figure II in Appendix A displays the percentage of X 
choices conditional on participation for both phases for both cost treatments for the 16 NO-COMM 
sessions. Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests indicate no significant difference in the rate at which X is 
chosen between high and low cost costs groups in both Phases I (p-value = 0.461) and Phase II (p-
value = 0.368). Accordingly, our data do not provide support for Hypothesis II. Thus, while it is a 
deterrent for participation, the transaction cost regardless of its value does not hinder the ability of 
the AB to incentivize efficient X strategy choices in groups who participate. This result is true for 
any level of subject experience.  
 Next consider participation rates and efficient land use choice X in the COMM sessions.14  
The two bottom panels of Figure 1 display participation rates for the 8 COMM sessions under the 
two transaction cost ordering treatments for all periods across both phases. No discernible time 
trend exists in any phase, and the participation is higher when transaction costs are lower (after 
few initial periods). For an understanding of these outcomes, we analyze the nature of 
communication.  
Figure 2 presents information on chat frequency, indicating that despite adding to the total 
transaction costs incurred, subjects utilized communication opportunities to promote efficient 
strategy choices. Of the 195 chat rooms used, there is a predominance of dialogues (69 instances 
                                                          
13 Concerning the frequency of Y choices, Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests indicate a marginally significant transaction 
cost treatment effect (p-value = 0.052) in Phase I and at a 5% level of significance (p-value = 0.047) in the latter part 
of Phase II of the No-COMM sessions (after Period 20).  
14 We also ran 8 sessions under both cost orderings where communication was free and observed participation and 
efficient choices very near 100%. We do not report these additional results in the interests of brevity.  
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constituting 138 chat rooms in total) rather than monologues (57 chat rooms in total) under all 
conditions except in Phase I of the LHTC-COMM sessions. This is not surprising as a dialogue is 
a more credible form of communication. Players exchanging messages have a stronger chance of 
agreement than in a monologue where the messaging player has no way of knowing if the receiver 
will respond appropriately. Yet as mentioned earlier, the communication fee elevates the 
credibility of messages conveyed through monologues, both for the senders and receivers. For the 
receiver, the fee paid by the sender may signal commitment to the message content and for the 
sender it can serve as a commitment mechanism to follow through with what is communicated.  
Focusing on the timing of communication, Figure 3 indicates that most messaging occurs 
in the early periods of both Phase I (nearly 65% of all chat rooms) when subjects are unfamiliar or 
have low levels of experience in the experiment and early in Phase II (remaining 35%) when 
subjects are re-assigned to new neighbors. Such behavior is to be expected given the costly 
messaging setting because once coordination on a particular strategy has been established most 
subjects do not need to pay the messaging fee and rely predominantly on information feedback at 
the end of a period before making subsequent choices.   
Turning to the communication content, Table 3 presents the Cohen’s Kappa values and the 
relative frequency of the different categories and sub-categories into which the messages were 
classified. The most common category coded is “Influence neighbors to choose Strategy X” 
(Category 4X) with a frequency of 44%; i.e., in 44% of the chat rooms, a subject tried to influence 
a neighbor to select strategy X by sending a message such as “Pick X and we all win big”. 
Moreover, across all COMM sessions we find that in 72 out of the 99 cases when subjects sent 
messages classified in this way, the neighbor receiving the communication selected X.  
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The second most common category with an average frequency of 33% is “Discuss 
experimental game features and payoffs” (Category 10). This category mainly includes messages 
that explain the value of coordination on strategy X to neighbors such as “If you participate and 
choose X you will see a much larger payoff”. The category “Declare one’s commitment to select 
Strategy X” (Category 1X) is coded with an average frequency of 28% and is often combined with 
Category 4X as is evident from the statement “I’m going to choose A. it would do well if you did 
the same. We will garner the most money this way”. In fact 61 instances of X choices are observed 
in the periods in which players sent messages (across all COMM sessions through 65 chat rooms) 
conveying their commitment to strategy X. Such commitment is also strongly predicated on past 
behavior. Of the subjects who communicated to neighbors that they were committed to X (in 44 
chat rooms across all COMM sessions), 32 had chosen X in the previous period.15  
Finally, Category 8, denoting “Ask neighbors to influence their other neighbor's future 
strategy choice”, has a frequency of 18% and it highlights the importance of the network structure. 
It indicates that subjects recognize that sustained participation and efficient coordination over 
repeated interactions requires neighbors’ neighbors to participate and choose X as well. Thus, 
subject use messages such as “The entire room needs to choose X to maximize payout, begin 
choosing X and pass it on to your other neighbor” in 39 chat rooms (across all COMM sessions).  
These frequently-used categories represent the overarching goal of communication within 
this strategic setting – namely to reduce strategic uncertainty in favor of a strategy, to spread 
information about the benefits of choosing a particular strategy, and to generate sustained 
commitment for that strategy. The choice data confirm that communication is successful because 
                                                          
15 The number of chat rooms (44) mentioned here is different from the total classified in Category 1X (65). This is 
because when assessing the relationship between messaging content and previous period behavior, we excluded 21 
chat rooms for Period 1 for which there is no past history and for Period 16 in which neighbor identity and the strategic 
setting were reset.  
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relative to NO-COMM settings, little negative time trend exists in participation rates (Figure 1 
bottom panel) and a weak or no time trend exists for X choices conditional on participation (bottom 
panel of Figure II in Appendix A). Despite the obvious value of communication to promote 
coordination, however, 17 (out of 64) individuals never communicate. These individuals 
sometimes received messages from neighbors and could have also used feedback information 
about neighbors’ behavior at the end of a period to guide their behavior towards participation and 
efficient coordination.  
To evaluate the impact of transaction costs on participation in the presence of 
communication opportunities, we analyze participation decisions using 2-way clustered logit 
regressions for both phases. The dependent variable is the likelihood of participation in a period. 
The control variable is the dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the high cost sessions.16 The 
standard errors are clustered by subject and period (Cameron et al. 2012). The regression results 
are presented in Model (1) and Model (2) of Table 4 and suggest no significant transaction cost 
treatment effect in Phase I and a negative and significant effect in Phase II at 1% significance level. 
This result provides partial support (in Phase II only) for Hypothesis I for the COMM treatment. 
Note that this result contrasts with the finding in the NO-COMM treatment, where the treatment 
effect is found in Phase I only.  
In the COMM treatment subjects use communication to encourage their neighbors to 
participate, to generate commitment for choosing the efficient strategy, and to ensure that the 
willingness to participate and the commitment to choose X is passed on to other parts of the local 
network through direct and indirect neighbor linkages. This implies that in Phase I communication 
allows groups to sustain a stable participation rate over repeated interactions even with high 
                                                          
16 We do not control for learning effects since Figure 1 (bottom panel) does not indicate any trend in the data. 
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transaction costs. Combined with the fact that participation rates remain high and stable in the low 
cost groups, no treatment effect emerges in Phase I. In Phase II after the treatment switchover, 
participation rates remain near the level observed during Phase I in the LHTC-COMM groups. For 
the HLTC-COMM groups, nearly everyone participates in Phase II owing to improvement in cost 
conditions. This situation leads to a significant cost treatment effect in Phase II.  
Conditional on participation, 2-way clustered logit regression results indicate a 
significantly greater likelihood (at 1% level of significance) of X choices in high cost groups than 
in low cost groups in the presence of communication in Phase I. This provides support for 
Hypothesis II for the communication treatment and is contrary to the result obtained for NO-
COMM. One possible explanation for this finding is that since subjects are already paying a high 
transaction cost, the extra communication fee if paid increases the value of the communication and 
focuses behavior of more subjects (senders and receivers) in the HLTC-COMM sessions on X than 
it does in the LHTC-COMM sessions where the losses from paying the transaction cost and the 
messaging fee are lower. 
Considering differences in behavior driven by the communication treatment, relative to no 
communication we can draw two conclusions from Figure 1. First, the participation rate is on 
average higher with communication than without it under both transaction cost conditions.  
Second, communication plays a more important role in the high transaction cost groups than in the 
low cost groups. Communication in high-cost groups averts the negative trend observed in the 
corresponding groups without communication in both phases, whereas in the low-cost groups 
behavior is relatively stable both with and without communication. For a statistical analysis of 
these claims, we employ 4 clustered logit regressions (one for each Phase and transaction cost 
condition). The dependent variable is again the likelihood of participation, which is regressed on 
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a dummy variable equal to 1 for the COMM sessions, the reciprocal of the Period variable to 
control for learning and capture the time trends, and an interaction term between these two 
variables to account for differences in learning rates between treatments. All standard errors are 
clustered by subject and period. Table 5 presents the results in Models (1) through (4). 
A positive and significant estimate (at the 1% level)  is obtained for the  communication 
treatment dummy variable in both phase regressions for the high cost condition and for Phase II 
of the low cost treatment, providing partial support for Hypothesis III(a). Thus, while incurring an 
additional transaction cost for the subjects who choose to message (and 47 subjects do so at various 
points during the experiment), communication resolves the strategic uncertainty of many more 
subjects in the COMM sessions leading to more X choices. The positive estimate for the reciprocal 
of the period variable and the negative estimate for the interaction term for both phases of the high-
cost treatment and Phase I of the low-cost treatment signify the impact of experience on 
participation. Thus, relative to no-communication scenarios, communication has an 
unambiguously positive effect under unfavorable participation conditions and its benefits under 
low-cost conditions are obtained only when subjects have had no prior experience with 
participation in the AB scheme. To summarize: 
 
Result 3: Communication generates greater rates of participation in the AB scheme. 
Communication has a greater positive impact when compared to the no-communication setting in 
high-cost groups at all levels of subject experience than in low-cost groups.   
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4.2 Spatial Coordination 
This section presents an analysis of location-specific land use choices of all participants to 
assess the performance of the AB in creating spatially coordinated land use patterns. We develop 
a performance metric counting every instance where a subject and his/her two direct neighbors 
within their local neighborhood are able to locally coordinate on the same land use strategy. This 
metric can take a maximum value of 8, signifying that all 8 group members are perfectly or globally 
coordinated on either strategy X or Y. Any other lower non-zero value indicates only localized 
clustering of similar choices on the network. In this format, the same metric captures instances of 
both local and global coordination that are routinely observed in all groups during the experiment. 
Since coordination on X is Pareto efficient, we refer to this as locally efficient coordination. 
Let us start by examining spatial coordination under the no-communication regime. The 
top two panels of Figure 4 present the average levels of locally efficient coordination by a subject 
and both of their neighbors in the NO-COMM groups for all periods of Phases I and II. Localized 
coordination on X is of special interest for the high-cost condition since the non-participation 
strategy NP strictly dominates option Y. For these groups, post-participation, forward induction 
reasoning can guide many adjacent subjects’ choices to the Pareto efficient X equilibrium. While 
forward induction may not explain the many adjacent X choices in the low-cost groups, incurring 
the transaction cost focuses multiple neighboring subjects’ choices on X, which pays more than Y 
in the event of localized coordination.  
A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test detects a significant difference in efficient localized 
coordination between low and high-cost groups without communication (p-value = 0.05) in Phase 
I after Period 8. This finding is aligned with the results supporting Hypothesis I as presented in the 
discussion on participation. Since participation is significantly lower in the HLTC-NO-COMM 
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sessions, so is overall AB performance. A likely reason for any significant difference appearing 
after Period 8 is that in the initial periods subjects are unfamiliar with the strategic environment, 
so most X choices are either non-adjacent or involve only two neighbors selecting X.  
With repeated interactions, participation rates fall in both groups, but they fall more steeply 
in the high-cost sessions (as an increasing number of subject’s strategic uncertainty gets resolved 
in favor of NP) causing fewer neighbors to choose X. As a result, rates of localized efficient 
coordination fall to about 14% in Period 15 in HLTC-NO-COMM groups. Performance is 
maintained between 40% and 50% in the LHTC-NO-COMM groups, where more people choose 
X and the participation rate has a weak negative trend, leading to the significant treatment effect. 
In Phase II there is no significant difference across transaction cost treatments, consistent with the 
previous result regarding no significant difference in participation rates.  
Figure 5 presents the fraction of instances of globalized efficient coordination for the NO-
COMM sessions, defined as all eight group members choosing X. Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests 
indicate no significant cost-treatment effect in either Phase. Group-level coordination is difficult 
– for any value of the transaction cost, it is challenging to get all group members to make the same 
choices, especially given that information feedback is limited to direct neighbors. Yet positive 
rates of global coordination suggest that, despite participation challenges, the AB scheme can 
sometimes fully coordinate environmentally-beneficial choices.  
 
Result 4: Greater transaction costs reduce localized efficient coordination only for inexperienced 
groups and globalized efficient coordination is not significantly impacted by variation in the 
transaction cost values.  
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 Let us now compare rates of spatial coordination with communication. The bottom panel 
of Figure 4 shows the percentage of localized coordination in the COMM groups by transaction 
cost and for both phases. A surprising result is that in Phase I, localized coordination is greater in 
the HLTC-COMM groups relative to the LHTC-COMM groups. This difference is marginally 
significant at the 10% level on the basis of a 2-way clustered logit regression (Table 4, Model (3)) 
where the dependent variable takes a value of one when players within a local neighborhood are 
able to coordinate on the efficient strategy X and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the 
high cost treatment dummy and the reciprocal of the period variable included to capture non-linear 
rates of learning. Thus, although in Phase I there is no support for Hypothesis I (as there is no 
difference in the number of individuals who participate under the two cost conditions), more 
neighboring players participate in HLTC-COMM groups than in LHTC-COMM groups. Localized 
coordination is improved in low-cost groups in Phase II relative to high-cost groups since virtually 
every individual in the HLTC-COMM group participates (reinforcing the significant treatment 
effect supporting Hypothesis I) and nearly everyone chooses X. Model (4) in Table 4 shows that 
this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level on the basis of a 2-way clustered logit 
regression.17  
Finally, we compare localized coordination rates with and without communication.  
Models (5) through (8) in Table 5 present the results of four 2-way clustered logit regressions (for 
each Phase and transaction cost condition). The dependent variable takes a value of one when 
players within a local neighborhood are able to coordinate and choose X. Similar to the previous 
models, the control variables include a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the COMM sessions, 
                                                          
17 2-way clustered logit regressions (with every group being the unit of observation) indicate no significant effect of 
transaction costs on likelihood of global efficient coordination in the presence of communication (the data pooled 
across all sessions are presented in Figure 5). 
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the reciprocal of the period variable and an interaction term. Results indicate a significant (at the 
1% level) and positive estimate for the COMM dummy variable in both phase regressions for the 
high transaction cost condition and for the low-cost condition in Phase II, substantiating the 
information presented in Figure 4 when comparing across top and bottom panels for each cost 
condition and phase.  
Relative to the no-communication settings, messaging can guide behavior of a greater 
number of adjacent individuals to the efficient choice, hence significantly improving the likelihood 
of localized efficient coordination. For groups facing low transaction costs, the COMM dummy 
variable is not significant in Phase I which is in line with Result 3. Moreover, the signs of the 
significant estimates for the interaction term and the reciprocal of the period variable for the high-
cost models indicate that repeated interactions improve performance in groups with 
communication. Since the negative trend is largely a result of strategic uncertainty being resolved 
in favor of NP and communication reduces strategic uncertainty in favor of participation and X, 
this result follows automatically. This finding supports Hypothesis III(b) and underscores the 
positive role of communication (even though it adds to the transaction cost incurred) in guiding 
the selection of the efficient Nash equilibrium outcome in coordination games with both Pareto-
dominant and risk-dominant Nash equilibria within a local network.  
 
Result 5: Mechanisms to reduce strategic uncertainty, such as communication, can build 
commitment for choosing the efficient strategy and improve AB performance in the presence of 
transaction costs.  
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5. Discussion 
 Our study results are of course predicated on the nature of the strategic environment, i.e., 
the payoff functions under either high or low transaction costs, the size and circular nature of the 
local network, and the degree of information feedback. A circular network does not describe many 
real world settings where an AB policy could be introduced. Using a spatial set-up different from 
the circular network (such as a line or lattice) may produce different results, since some individuals 
would have different numbers of neighbors, and would therefore face different levels of strategic 
uncertainty and payoffs. In the context of coordination games, Cassar (2007) finds that the 
frequency of payoff-dominant choices is higher in a “small world” or a “random” network than in 
a local network such as the one we consider. She also finds that coordination is obtained much 
faster in the small world setting, while noting that “a theory linking network characteristics to 
individual behavior is not yet available” (page 228). However, compared to networks where 
strategic uncertainty varies across players, we could argue that the circular network provides a 
lower bound on coordination failure in an AB setting. 
We could have chosen a transaction cost value less than 40, which would not have made Y 
strictly dominated by NP. We conjecture that this would lead to much greater participation and 
many more Y choices than is currently observed under the high-cost treatment. While this is 
interesting, this finding is similar to results obtained in Banerjee et al. 2014 and could have 
eliminated (i) any difference between high-cost and low-cost groups and (ii) subjects’ ability to 
use forward induction to guide their behavior in our network AB coordination game. Moreover, 
the transaction cost treatment is more interesting if it generates differences in the set of equilibria 
compared to when it just produces a difference in net payoffs. This leads to an interesting thought 
experiment: if a regulator wishes to increase participation or efficient localized coordination in an 
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AB scheme for a given budget, is it better to spend this money on increasing the baseline 
(participation) subsidy, or on subsidizing the transactions costs that participants face (e.g. by 
providing free advice)? In our experiment, no real difference exists in the effects of these actions 
if the subsidy increase is equivalent for schemes X and Y, other than in the framing of the payments. 
But targeting the baseline subsidy increase at X only could increase the uptake of this land use 
relative to Y or non-participation by more than an equivalent reduction in transactions costs. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to test whether significant differences in desired spatial 
coordination emerge from such re-allocation of funds in the lab. 
 The size of the circular network and nature of information feedback may also impact 
behavior. More information and smaller group sizes usually generate greater rates of efficient 
choices in coordination games. However, with a group size of 8 we believe we have struck a 
reasonable middle ground whereby the group is small enough for many individuals to choose X 
and large enough for many to select NP or Y (owing to high strategic uncertainty). With this group 
size we are able to assess the extent to which the AB can still deliver on its environmental goal 
when the effect of each individual is relatively small compared to the total group. Finally, we could 
have provided information to subjects beyond their local neighborhoods (e.g., on their indirect 
neighbors such as in Banerjee et al., 2014). Although this would be inconsistent with our localized 
communication format, it provides an avenue for future research especially if regulatory agencies 
start publicly announcing enrollment rates in order to promote greater participation. It is also 
possible that coordination failure would have implications for what participants consider “fair”, 
and this could influence the likelihood of coordination on the Pareto-superior equilibrium, 
especially if outcomes are observable such as in Reeson et al. (2011).  
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6. Conclusions 
PES schemes are increasingly being implemented as policy mechanisms to enhance the 
supply of ecosystem services. The predominant property rights regime in countries such as the US, 
the UK, New Zealand and Australia requires that landowners be financially compensated to 
encourage the supply of ecosystem services, rather than being compelled to do so by regulation: 
the “provider gets” principle (Hanley et al. 1998). Second, for many environmental outcomes, 
spatial coordination increases the size of environmental benefits for a given level of enrollment in 
voluntary conservation programs. The policy design challenge is to find systems of incentives that 
spatially coordinate a voluntary sign-up program. The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is one such 
mechanism. However, the AB faces a number of potential problems, including the tendency over 
time for participants to converge on risk-dominant outcomes, a lack of cost-effectiveness, and, like 
many incentive programs, the size and nature of transaction costs. To date, the effects of 
transactions costs have not been investigated in the AB literature, despite their importance to PES 
scheme participation decisions.  
In this paper we use a laboratory experiment to investigate how private transaction costs 
affect the degree of participation in an AB scheme, its efficiency and the patterns of spatial 
coordination in the presence and absence of communication. Results show that higher transaction 
costs lead to greater non-participation, whilst lower transaction costs are conducive to producing 
a greater degree of coordination on the most preferred environmental outcome. Full coordination 
on the most efficient outcome is rarely achieved, but localized clusters of coordinated conservation 
actions emerge in most cases.  
Communication is costly and thus adds to the transaction costs incurred, but it improves 
outcomes, generating economic and environmental benefits. There are clear parallels here with 
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experimental findings on the implications of communication (albeit costless) in “ambient” 
pollution tax schemes (Segerson 1988), where the pollution tax liability of each firm depends on 
group behavior. For example, Suter et al. (2008) find that allowing participants to communicate in 
a non-binding fashion produces lower pollution levels and maximizes group profits. Our 
communication results can also be compared with the effects of costless communication in 
experiments on Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms for public goods, such as in Isaac and Walker 
(1988), where non-binding group discussion significantly reduced free-riding behavior. 
The policy implications of our results are clear: if the regulator can design an AB scheme 
in a way which keeps transaction costs low relative to the payoffs of coordination, then it will be 
easier to achieve spatial coordination (both locally and globally). This, in turn, enhances a more 
effective delivery of ecosystem services. However, if achieving a given environmental objective 
requires writing (complicated) rules for potential participants, then there is a trade-off between 
improving environmental effectiveness and increasing coordination, since such complications will 
increase transactions costs. Set against this scenario, facilitating low-cost communication between 
landowners would improve the likelihood of successful coordination towards socially-desirable 
land use patterns. Providing subsidies to lower transaction costs initially would also foster early 
coordination, and our results suggest that improved performance could persist even after such 
subsidies are removed and transaction costs increase. 
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TABLES 
Table 1a: Payoff Table for High Transaction Cost condition 
Payoff Table 
Actions Chosen by Neighbors 
Your Action 
Both 
Participate 
Choose X 
Both 
Participate 
and one 
Chooses X 
& other Y 
Both 
Participate 
and 
Choose Y 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses 
X 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses 
Y 
No 
Neighbor 
Participates 
X 210 125 40 125 40 40 
Y 145 155 165 145 155 145 
NP (Non-
Participation) 
175 175 175 175 175 175 
 
Table 1b: Payoff Table for Low Transaction Cost condition 
Payoff Table 
Actions Chosen by Neighbors 
Your Action 
Both 
Participate 
Choose X 
Both 
Participate 
& one 
Chooses X 
& other Y 
Both 
Participate 
& Choose 
Y 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses 
X 
Only one 
Participates 
& Chooses 
Y 
No 
Neighbor 
Participates 
X 235 150 65 150 65 65 
Y 170 180 190 170 180 170 
NP (Non-
Participation) 
175 175 175 175 175 175 
 
Table 2: Summary of Experimental Design 
 Communication Treatment 
Transaction Cost Ordering 
Treatment 
No-Comm Comm 
High-Low 
HLTC-No-Comm  
(8 sessions) 
HLTC-Comm  
(4 sessions) 
Low-High 
LHTC-No-Comm  
(8 sessions) 
LHTC-Comm  
(4 sessions) 
38 
 
Table 3: Categories for coding messages (reaching at least Moderate Reliability) and 
observed frequency in chat rooms 
+ Only those categories (and sub-categories) reaching an agreement of Moderate or higher reliability are listed. X 
and Y labels correspond to Strategies A and B in the experiment.  
* Represents categories which have a relative frequency of coding of 15% or more. 
 
Category+ Description 
Cohen’s  
Kappa 
Relative 
Frequency  
of Coding 
1 Declare one’s commitment to a particular strategy   
1X Will select X 0.83 0.28* 
1Y Will select Y 0.90 0.03 
1NP Will select NP 0.75 0.06 
2 Explain own reason for choosing a strategy (X, Y or NP)   
2P In the past periods 0.45 0.02 
3 
Inform one neighbor about other neighbor’s strategy 
choice 
  
3X Other neighbor chose X 0.45 0.03 
3Y Other neighbor chose Y 0.79 0.03 
3NP Other neighbor chose NP 0.69 0.04 
3NX Other neighbor did  not chose X 0.56 0.03 
4 Influence neighbor(s) to select a particular strategy   
4X Choose X 0.81 0.44* 
4Y Choose Y 0.78 0.02 
4NP Choose NP 0.79 0.01 
5 Ask neighbors about their future choices 0.55 0.07 
6 Ask neighbors about their reasons for choosing a strategy 0.65 0.03 
7 Ask neighbors about their other neighbors past choices 0.53 0.02 
8 
Ask neighbors to influence their other neighbor's future 
strategy choice 
0.88 0.18* 
8X Influence other neighbor to select X 0.89 0.17 
8Y Influence other neighbor to select Y 0.49 0.00 
9 Refer to own past strategy choice 0.49 0.01 
10 Discuss about experimental features & game payoffs 0.73 0.33* 
11 Agree on a strategy 0.55 0.13 
12 Other 0.54 0.34* 
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Table 4: 2-way Clustered Logit Regressions for Participation and Performance Analysis in 
each Phase for Communication Groups 
Dependent  
Variables 
Participation Localized Efficient Coordination 
Independent  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II 
High Transaction 
Cost 
-0.024 
(0.019) 
-0.157** 
(0.032) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.106*** 
(0.023) 
𝟏
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅+
 
 
- - 
-1.343** 
(0.344) 
-0.756** 
(0.048) 
Constant 
2.161** 
(0.612) 
7.43** 
(1.15) 
-0.098 
(0.478) 
1.975*** 
(0.49) 
Number of 
observations 
960 (480 in each Phase) 
Cluster Variables Individual Subject and Experimental Period in a Phase 
** Represents statistical significance at the 1% level, * at the 10% level 
+ Period takes a value between 1 and 15 
 
Table 5: 2-way Clustered Logit Regressions for Performance comparison of 
Communication and No Communication Treatments by Phase and Transaction Cost# 
Independent 
Variables 
Participation Localized Efficient Coordination 
Model 1: 
Phase I 
(HC) 
Model 2: 
Phase II 
(LC) 
Model 3: 
Phase I 
(LC) 
Model 4: 
Phase II 
(HC) 
Model 5: 
Phase I 
(HC) 
Model 6: 
Phase II 
(LC) 
Model 7: 
Phase I 
(LC) 
Model 8: 
Phase II 
(HC) 
Comm 
0.892*** 
(0.229) 
1.999*** 
(0.622) 
0.197 
( 0.245) 
0.782*** 
(0.246) 
1.063*** 
(0.221) 
2.019*** 
(0.374) 
0.028 
(0.192) 
0.864*** 
(0.237) 
𝟏
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅+
 
2.197**  
(0.871) 
0.428 
(0.421) 
1.960*** 
( 0.652) 
2.674*** 
(0.902) 
0.027 
(0.458) 
-0.368 
(0.227) 
-1.152*** 
(0.381) 
0.610** 
(0.252) 
𝟏
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅+
 
x 
Comm 
-1.060** 
(-0.467) 
-1.094 
(0.81) 
-1.285*** 
(0.356) 
-1.179*** 
(0.489) 
-0.848** 
(0.368) 
-0.375 
(0.658) 
0.078 
(0.327) 
-0.652*** 
(0.095) 
Constant 
-0.600** 
(0.29) 
1.579*** 
(0.251) 
1.549*** 
(0.29) 
-0.5* 
(0.26) 
-1.088*** 
(0.297) 
-0.086 
(0.728) 
0.171 
(0.449) 
-0.546** 
(0.245) 
Number of 
Observations 
1440 
Cluster 
Variables 
Individual Subject and Experimental Period in a Phase 
# HC refers to High Transaction Cost and LC refers to Low Transaction Cost 
*** Represents statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level 
+ Period takes a value between 1 and 15 
